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1Summary
Private enforcement, where victims of a competition infringement claim 
compensation from the infringer, has so far not played a prominent role 
within the EU. It has been stated that only 25 % of the Commission’s 
antitrust decision were followed by private damages action between 2008 
and 2012. Furthermore, the major part of these claims was filed in the UK, 
the Netherlands and Germany. As a response to this, the Commission 
proposed a new directive in 2013, with the aim to facilitate private 
enforcement claims and in the same time protect the public enforcement 
mechanism.
The EU situation with few private enforcement claims forms a sharp 
contrast to the US one, where private enforcement is the major branch of 
competition enforcement. Treble damages, generous rules on disclosure and 
favorable rules to form class actions have created an industry surrounding 
private enforcement, making it extremely popular in the US.
The new directive as approved by the European Parliament and soon to be 
approved by the Council contains many solutions to the often difficult 
situations faced by a victim claiming compensation. In the same time it is 
clear the EU tries to go its own way, avoiding the generous US system. New 
features in the directive includes the introduction of a disclosure system 
where victims can apply at national courts to have the infringer release 
documents related to the infringement, protection of certain documents, 
allowing the passing-on defense, making decisions by national competition 
authorities binding on national courts and providing rules on joint and 
several liability.
The path chosen by the EU threatens to not provide victims with enough 
incentive to claim compensation as private enforcement actions are still 
burdensome to conduct and may harm important business relationships.
However, as victims receive new possibilities to support their claims for 
compensation, the new directive will really provide victims with greater 
possibilities to become victors in private enforcement actions. 
2Sammanfattning
Privata skadeståndsprocesser, där den part som lidit skada av ett 
konkurrensbrott kräver kompensation från skadevållaren, har än så länge 
inte haft en framträdande roll i EU. Enbart 25 % av kommissionens 
kartellbeslut följdes upp med privata processer mellan 2008 och 2012, och 
av dessa skedde merparten i Storbritannien, Nederländerna och Tyskland. 
Som ett svar på detta föreslog kommissionen ett nytt direktiv 2013 som 
skulle underlätta privata skadeståndsprocesser och samtidigt skydda den 
offentliga kontrollmekanismen bestående av böter och möjlighet till 
eftergift.
Situationen i EU skiljer sig mycket from situationen i USA, där privata 
skadeståndsprocesser är den viktigaste mekanismen för att förhindra 
konkurrensbrott. Tredubbla skadestånd, generösa editionsregler och 
fördelaktiga regler för grupptalan har skapat en stor industri kring privata 
skadeståndsprocesser. 
Det nya direktivet som godkänts av EU-parlamentet och inom kort av rådet
innehåller många lösningar till de problem som skadelidande part möter i en 
privat skadeståndsprocess. Samtidigt går EU i och med direktivet sin egen 
väg, och undviker det generösa systemet i USA. Nya regler i direktivet 
inkluderar bland annat system med editionsföreläggande där skadelidande 
part kan ansöka hos nationell domstol om att få ut dokument hos 
skadevållande part, skydd för vissa typer av dokument, tillåtande av 
övervältring, bindande effekt av nationella konkurrensmyndigheters beslut 
och regler om solidariskt ansvar.
EU:s system riskerar att inte erbjuda offer till konkurrensrättsbrott 
tillräckligt med incitament att kräva kompensation, eftersom processen 
fortfarande är betungande och riskerar att skada viktiga affärsförbindelser. 
Trots detta ger ändå direktivet ökade möjligheter för offer att möjliggöra en 
kompensationstalan, varför det nya direktivet verkligen möjliggör för offer 
att till sist stå som segrare i privata konkurrensskadeståndsprocesser.      
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4Abbreviations
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1.1 Background
Private enforcement is the process where a private entity who has suffered 
from a breach of competition law turns to the infringer and tries to get 
compensation. An example of this is when customers to a cartel claim that 
they have been overcharged because of the unlawful cooperation between
sellers.
1
It may also be when a company has suffered from a dominant 
competitor’s margin squeeze.    
Private enforcement is the opposite of public enforcement where the 
Commission or a NCA investigate competition infringements and issue 
fines towards companies who breached competition law. These fines are 
penalties for the infringement, not meant to compensate the victims. 
Therefore, private enforcement is the only way for a victim of a competition 
infringement to receive compensation for the suffered injury.
2
However, private enforcement in EU competition law has so far been 
scarce. This despite the fact that consumers and business in the EU lose 
about 13-37 billion euro every year due to hardcore competition
infringements such as cartels, according to the Commission.
3
In a speech in November 2013, the Commissioner responsible for 
competition, Mr Almunia, stated that only 25 % of the Commission’s 
decisions concerning antitrust infringements between 2008 and 2012 were 
followed by private damages actions. Furthermore, three countries, the UK, 
the Netherlands and Germany stood for a large portion of the private 
actions. Because of this, Mr Almunia concluded that the new directive
4
was
needed to supply all business and consumers within the Union with means 
for compensation as well as safeguard the efficiency of public enforcement.
5
   
As a comparison in the US, private enforcement is more frequently used and 
about 90% of all antitrust cases in courts are private initiatives.
6
In the EU,
                                                
1
EU Commission, Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Green paper, 
2005, COM(2005) 672 final p 3.
2
EU Commission, On certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union, Directive Proposal, 2013, COM(2013) 404 final, p 2.
3
EU Commission, Impact assessment, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008) 405, 
p 14.
4
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions 
of the Member States and of the European Union. The final text may be found at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-
2014-0089+002-002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, as of 26 May 2014.
5
EU Commission - SPEECH/13/887 of 07/11/2013.
6
Foer, A Albert, The Ideal Model of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, 2009, p 8.
6public enforcement has instead been the preferred solution to deal with 
competition infringements and the Member States’ legal regimes concerning 
private enforcement have been criticised as underdeveloped and lacking 
uniform rules within the Union.
7
The starting point of private enforcement in EU law was the ECJ judgment 
Courage v. Crehan
8
where a private party invoked an infringement of TFEU 
art 101 as a legal ground to claim damages, a so-called “Euro-offense”
9
. The 
Commission realized the benefits of having an effective private enforcement 
system alongside public enforcement and started to investigate the area with 
the aim to make private enforcement more successful.
10
The Commission’s 
work ultimately led to a new directive proposal
11
in June 2013, with the aim 
to remove different problems concerning private enforcement within the 
Member States. On the 17 April 2014, the Parliament approved, with over 
90% of the votes, a text to the directive, as agreed upon with the Council.
12
According to the agreed text, the directive should be implemented by the 
Member States two years after it enters into force.
13
The Council is expected 
to approve the text within the following months.  
The question is if this new directive is the solution to all problems 
concerning private enforcement, and if the rules proposed in the directive is 
going to make it easier for private parties to be compensated for competition 
infringements.
1.2 Purpose and aim
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how private enforcement works in 
an EU competition law context, focusing on a claimant’s right to 
compensation for competition infringements, and what this legislative 
framework looks like after the new directive has been approved. 
Furthermore, the thesis will also analyse the different policy choices made 
by the Commission in the area of private enforcement.
                                                
7
Ashurst, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules, 2004, p 26f.
8
Courage v. Crehan (2001) C-453/99.
9
Van Bael, Ivo, 2011, Due Process in the EU competition proeedings.
10
EU Commission, Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Green Paper, 
2005, COM(2005) 672 final p 3.
11
EU Commission, On certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union, Directive Proposal, COM(2013) 404 final.
12
European Parliament, Plenary session Thursday 17 April 2014, Votes found at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bPV%2b20140417%2bRES-
VOT%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN.
Commission press release, IP/14/455 of 17/04/2014.
13
The text adopted by the European Parliament may be found at the Parliament’s website at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bTA%2b20140417%2bTOC%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%
2fEN.
7The ultimate aim of the thesis is to analyse if the directive offers enough 
possibilities for private parties to be compensated for harm suffered due to 
infringement of competition law. The research questions will therefore be;
1) What does the private enforcement regime under EU competition 
law looks like and does it offer enough ways for victims to claim 
compensation?
2) Does the directive proposal from the Commission give the 
possibility for victims to become victors in private enforcement 
proceedings?
1.3 Method and material
The primary method used in this thesis will be legal dogmatic method. By 
analysing legal primary and secondary sources of EU law the area of private 
enforcement in competition law will be presented and analysed. The 
approach of this thesis is both the de jure aspect of the area and the de facto
impact of private enforcement in EU competition law. 
In addition to the legal dogmatic method, this thesis will also use 
comparative method. Private enforcement has been a major component in 
the US competition law, much more used there compared to within the EU. 
This together with the fact that the US and the EU competition laws are very 
similar makes the area very suitable for a comparative approach. A 
comparative view will therefore also be adopted in this thesis, to investigate 
the US system and the pros and cons thereof and compare it to the EU 
approach.   
The material used will be primary EU law such as the TFEU, secondary law 
in the form of regulations, directives and EU soft law, such as guidelines. 
Commission works, for example green and white papers will also be of 
importance. Furthermore, supplementary law such as ECJ cases will be 
presented and analysed.
In line with the comparative approach, US’ sources of law will also be used. 
Important material for this part will be the US’ acts concerning competition 
law as well as relevant case law. 
In addition to these primary sources of law, secondary sources such as 
articles and other publications will be used as sources. I have used doctrine 
by respectable authors in the field of competition law and the literature 
concerns both the law aspect and practice of the field. In the search for 
materials to use, I have used the library resources such as search engines and 
catalogues, and as much as possible used first-hand sources.  
81.4 Limitation
In order to keep the thesis relatively short, the economic aspect of the 
private enforcement regime and the proposed directive will not be analysed.
Private International Law aspects will also be fully excluded since this area 
requires a thesis on its own. Because of the same reason, so-called umbrella 
damages will also be left out. Furthermore, even though the private 
enforcement regulation in the US is investigated, it will not be a very 
extensive presentation. US law will only be used as an example of how 
private enforcement could be handled, since the competition regulation in 
the EU and in the US share similarities. Lastly, this thesis will focus on the 
EU legislation and not discuss the situation in individual Member States.
1.5 Disposition
The thesis starts with a presentation of the private enforcement regime in the 
US. This may seems strange, but the US and the EU have competition 
regimes very much alike, and private enforcement has been much more 
prominent in the US. It is therefore beneficial to have some familiarity with 
the US system before being presented to the rules in the EU. 
Chapter 3 of the thesis presents private enforcement in the EU competition 
law, starting with a historical overview and then presents the options 
available to a claimant, followed by problematic areas and present 
regulations and case law. In chapter 4 the new directive on private actions 
for damages is introduced in detail, as well as the opinions of the different 
institutions and the solutions presented in the green and white papers. I have 
included the discussions among the institutions and earlier preparatory work 
because they help explain the present situation of private enforcement as 
well as the final policy solutions adopted.
Chapter 5 is discussion and analysis of the current private enforcement 
regime in the EU, starting with general findings followed by an analysis of
the directive. The situation for collective redress is then discussed. Finally, I 
discuss whether or not the new private enforcement regime after the 
directive leads to a victim becoming a victor in a private enforcement claim. 
92 Private Enforcement in the 
US
The US competition law statutes on federal level are the Sherman act
14
, the 
Clayton act
15
, and the Federal Trade Commission act
16
creating the basic 
legal framework of the area.
17
Furthermore, judgments and individual state 
legislation affect the area greatly.
18
The purpose of the US competition 
legislation is to protect consumers and safeguard that several types of goods 
are available at a reasonable price.
19
The Sherman act introduced the possibility for private entities to sue 
infringers of the act in 1890.
20
However, there was not much use of this 
possibility until after the Second World War, when the US Government 
increased the number of public enforcement cases.
21
Today, private 
enforcement actions are often, but not always, so-called follow-on actions, 
where public authorities already have found infringements.
22
In order to 
receive a corporate amnesty and being admitted into a leniency program, 
companies have to agree to pay compensation to its victims.
23
A leniency 
applicant has to supply victims with all the information and documents 
concerning an infringement, and in return the leniency applicant will only be 
liable for the actual harm incurred. A leniency applicant will not be liable 
for treble damages or damages to other than its own direct purchasers.
24
In order to bring a successful private enforcement claim, a private party 
must show that the Sherman act section 1 or section 2 has been breached. 
Private claims based on section 1 prohibiting agreements that restrict trade 
requires a party to prove that there is an agreement between two or more 
parties, that the agreement restricts competition and that it affects more than 
one state or foreign trade. Furthermore, the private party must show that his 
business has suffered harm due to the infringement, or that such harm is 
                                                
14
The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890).
15
The Clayton Antitrust Act (1914).
16
The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914).
17
Fox, Eleanor M, Trebilcock, Michael J, The Design of Competition Law Institutions: 
Global Norms, Local Choices,2012, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online p 330.
18
Foer, Albert A and Cuneo, Jonathan W, The international handbook on private 
enforcement of competition law, 2010, article by Sweeny, Bonny E, Defining antitrust 
violations in the US, Edgar Elgar Publishing Limited, p 37.
19
Fox Eleanor M, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, Global Competition 
Policy, Institute for International Economics, p 340.
20
The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), section 7.
21
Fox, Eleanor M, Trebilcock, Michael J, The Design of Competition Law Institutions: 
Global Norms, Local Choices,2012, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online p 334.
22
Ibid, p 340.
23
EU Commission Staff Working Paper, annex to the Green Paper Damages actions for 
breach of the EC competition rules, COM(2005) 672 final, p 64.
24
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (2004), p 118 Stat, 666-667.
10
imminent.
25
The Sherman act section 2 instead deals with monopolies. A 
private party must first show that there is a monopoly in the relevant market. 
Secondly it must been shown that the monopoly wilfully acquired or 
maintained its market power, instead of keeping it by “growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”
26
Lastly, the claimant must again prove that this conduct 
has led to harm.
27
2.1 Pre-trial discovery and evidence in 
private enforcement actions
In a private enforcement action, most of the evidence are in the possession 
of the respondent, with the claimant only being able to name probable 
employees involved, what kind of documents needed to support the claims 
and what other evidence that is needed.
28
Luckily, under US competition 
law, the claimant benefits from a broad pre-trial discovery. This means that 
a private party preparing a private enforcement claim can request many
important documents from the respondent, as well as acquire testimonies 
under oath. During a long time, it was also possible to bring a private 
enforcement claim without much evidence supporting it, relying on pre-trial 
discovery to support the claim. However, this possibility has recently been 
impeded by the US Supreme Court.
29
Still, due to the high amounts often 
sued for in private enforcement actions, there is a huge incentive to 
aggressively push for an extensive pre-trial discovery.
30
According to the Clayton act
31
section 5, any final judgment or decree 
issued in the US can be used as prima facie evidence of violation of US 
competition law.
                                                
25
Foer, Albert A and Cuneo, Jonathan W, The international handbook on private 
enforcement of competition law, 2010, article by Sweeny, Bonny E, Defining antitrust 
violations in the US, Edgar Elgar Publishing Limited, p 39.
26
United States v. Grinell Corp, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
27
Foer, Albert A and Cuneo, Jonathan W, The international handbook on private 
enforcement of competition law, 2010, article by Sweeny, Bonny E, Defining antitrust 
violations in the US, Edgar Elgar Publishing Limited, p 54.
28
Foer, Albert A and Stutz, Randy M, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United 
States: a handbook, article by Goldberg, Joseph and Gustafson, Dan E, Pretrial discovery 
in civil litigation Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, p 189.
29
Foer, Albert A and Cuneo, Jonathan W, The international handbook on private 
enforcement of competition law, 2010, article by Sweeny, Bonny E, Defining antitrust 
violations in the US, Edgar Elgar Publishing Limited, p 38.
30
Foer, Albert A and Stutz, Randy M, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United 
States: a handbook, article by Goldberg, Joseph and Gustafson, Dan E, Pretrial discovery 
in civil litigation Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, p 18.1
31
The Clayton act (1914).
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2.2 The possibility of treble damages
According to the Clayton act section 4
32
, any injured person shall receive 
three times the damage suffered along with the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable fee for legal representation. The possibility of getting legal fees 
compensated as well is an exception in the US, where each party usually 
bears its own legal costs. Furthermore, the possibility of claiming
compensation of legal costs is asymmetrical, since the respondent cannot 
claim compensation for his legal cost, even though he succeeds in his 
defence and defeats the claim.
33
The claimant’s legal representatives almost 
always work on a contingency fee when working with a private enforcement 
claim, and courts sometimes award the legal representatives a percent of the 
recovery fee, instead of hours spent on the case.
34
  
Antitrust defendants to a private enforcement action are jointly and severally 
liable for treble damage if they are jointly found infringing competition 
laws. Moreover, the defendants cannot seek repayment from the other cartel 
members to compensate.
35
  
The choice of treble damages is to create a provision that is both 
compensatory for the victim and penalizing for the infringer.
36
There was 
also an expectation that treble damages would help bring more competition 
infringements in the open, as private parties would bring claims.
37
However, 
there have been different opinions if this aim has been reached. Some 
authors claim that private parties claim compensation through follow-on
actions, rather than bringing an action independently, since filing a follow-
on action gives the claimant possibility to use the documentation generated 
by the public enforcement as evidence, increasing the success rate of the 
claim.
38
In recent years, independent private enforcement claims have risen, 
making those claims the most numerous types of private enforcement 
actions.
39
                                                
32
The Clayton act amended the Sherman act, and the treble damage provision was earlier 
found in the Sherman act section 7.
33
Wouter, Wils PJ, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, 2005, Hart publishing, 
Oregon, p 114.
34
Foer, Albert A and Stutz, Randy M, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United 
States: a handbook , article by Tabacco, Joseph and Martin, Scott, Settlement practice from 
both a plaintiff and defense perspective, Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, Massachusetts, USA, 
2012, p 333.
35
Foer, Albert A and Stutz, Randy M, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United 
States: a handbook , article by Gilbert, Pamela and Romanenko, Victoria, Proposals for 
reform, Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, p 376.
36
Vold, Lawrence 1939-1949, Are threefold damages under the anti-trust act penal or 
compensatory?28 Ky. L.J. 117 1939-1940, p 158f.
37
Maltz v. Sax, Circuit court of appeals, Seventh Circuit, 134 F.2D 2 (7TH CIR. 1943).
38
Clark, Homer, 1954, The treble damage bonanza: new doctrines of damages in private 
antitrust suits, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 363 1953-1954 p 363.
39
Foer, Albert A and Cuneo, Jonathan W, The international handbook on private 
enforcement of competition law, 2010, article by Sweeny, Bonny E, Defining antitrust 
violations in the US, Edgar Elgar Publishing Limited, p 37.
12
The possibility of treble damages has been seen as one reason why private 
enforcement is so popular in the US.
40
However, treble damages awarded 
may not be as high as it first appears, as US courts do not award 
prejudgment interest,
41
and parties usually have high costs for legal 
representatives.
2.3 The passing on defence
According to some countries’ competition law, the defendant can sometimes 
be allowed to use the passing on defence. Imagine that a group of companies 
selling sprinkles secretly agree to raise prices. They sell their sprinkles to ice 
cream vendors (direct purchasers) who sell ice creams with sprinkles to 
consumers (indirect purchasers). The sprinkles manufacturers’ unlawful 
cooperation is discovered and the ice cream vendors file a private 
enforcement suit, to recover the higher price paid for the sprinkles. The 
defending sprinkles manufacturers defend themselves by saying that the ice 
cream vendors have not suffered any damage, since they have passed the 
price increase on to the consumers. When the ice cream consumers later join 
together in a mass claim to get compensation from the sprinkles 
manufacturers, the sprinkle manufacturer now state that the consumers have 
not suffered a loss, since the overcharge have been absorbed by the ice 
cream vendors.
42
The problem here is that in the example above, by allowing the sprinkle 
manufacturers to choose whether to use the passing on defence or not, the 
manufacturers can defend themselves from all claims, thus leaving them 
unjustly enriched by their illegal cooperation. If the passing on defence is 
not allowed, then the ice cream vendors will end up unjustly enriched if they 
in fact have passed the increase of sprinkle price on to the consumers. 
Finally, if the passing on defence is allowed, then the consumers may end 
up unjustly enriched if the ice cream vendors absorbed the price increase 
themselves, by accepting a lower margin.
43
In US competition law, the Supreme Court has in two major cases decided 
to reject the possibility of using the passing on defence, and only allow 
direct purchasers standing when suing for compensation.
44
                                                
40
Foer, Albert A and Cuneo, Jonathan W, The international handbook on private 
enforcement of competition law, 2010, article by Sweeny, Bonny E, Defining antitrust 
violations in the US, Edgar Elgar Publishing Limited, p 37.
41
Lande, Robert H, Ohio State Law Journal 115, 1993, Are antitrust “treble” damages 
really single damages, p 468.
42
Compare with Strand, Magnus, The Defense of Passing On: Loss, Gain and the Award of 
Damages in Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Uppsala Faculty of Law, Working 
Paper 2010:5, p 3.
43
Ibid, p 5f.
44
Ibid p 6.
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2.3.1 Hannover Shoe
In the Hannover Shoe case, the claimant Hannover Shoe sued United Shoe 
Machinery Corp for treble damages since United Shoe Machinery Corp had 
monopolized the market for shoe manufacturing machines, and then only let 
Hannover Shoe lease the machines, not buy them. Hannover Shoe sued for 
the price difference between leasing costs incurred and what the buying
price would have been if the company had instead bought the machines. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp lodged in the defence that United Shoe had 
not suffered any damage, since any exceed costs had been passed on to 
United Shoe’s customers.
45
The Supreme Court stated that if the passing on defence would be allowed, 
then the investigations of to what extent it had been passed on, would prove 
“insurmountable”. Furthermore, consumers bringing a claim would also 
have to investigate to what extent they had born the increase in price, and 
since final customers suffer only a tiny amount of the competition 
infringement costs, those would not have any interest in carrying out any 
investigation. Thus, final consumers would not bother to bring a claim at all, 
leaving the companies infringing competition law unjustly enriched.
46
The 
Supreme Court therefore rejected the passing on defence.
47
2.3.2 Illinois Bric
In the Illinois Bric case, the State of Illinois and 700 local governmental 
entities brought a claim against concrete block manufacturers. The concrete 
block manufacturers had been involved in price-fixing, and sold concrete 
blocks to masonry contractors, who had then through general contractors 
finally sold the concrete blocks in masonry works to the State of Illinois and 
the governmental entities.
48
The Supreme Court stated that if the passing on defence could not be used 
as a defence, then it could neither be used offensively by the State of Illinois 
and the other claimants.
49
If the passing on defence could be used in an 
offensive way, then indirect purchasers could claim compensation even 
though direct purchasers had already received full compensation. This 
would lead to multiple liabilities for the defendants.
50
Because of the two cases above, the US competition law only allow direct 
purchasers to have legal standing when filing a suit for compensation, due to 
competition infringement. Indirect purchasers are not allowed suing for 
compensation under federal law. However, many states have found these 
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judgments unjust, and allowed indirect purchasers to sue for compensation
under state law. As of April 2007, 35 states have allowed indirect 
purchasers such standing.
51
    
2.4 Class actions
The possibility of class action is another reason why private enforcement in 
the US is so frequently used. According to one study in 2009, 70 % of all 
the private enforcement claims are made up by class actions, up from 15 % 
in 1999.
52
Class actions are useful as such actions make it possible to bundle a lot of 
small claims into one big action for compensation. Consumers and 
customers who individually suffered harm too small to start an action over 
can join and share the litigation cost.
53
Participants to a class action can be found through media advertising or by 
other means of identification and if the class action sues for money, an opt-
out system is mandatory, according to the Class Action Fairness Act rule 23.
Opt-out means that individuals not wanting to participate in the class action 
have to notify the class action representative in order not to be bound by its 
outcome.
54
This is the opposite of an opt-in system where people who want 
to participate in a class action have to notify the representatives to be added.
2.5 The state of private enforcement in the 
US today
The possibility of private enforcement in the US has been heavily criticized
in recent years. Critics mean that the possibility of class actions provide for 
a form of legal extortion, where respondents are pressured to settle in order 
to avoid huge litigation costs and possible expensive judgments, and that the
only ones who benefit from private enforcement actions are the lawyers.
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Therefore, discussions have been held about curbing the possibility of 
private enforcement claims.
55
In one private enforcement judgment from 2007, the so-called Twombly 
case, the Supreme Court expressed the view that private enforcement can 
lead to settlements even though the claim is unfounded. The extensive pre-
trial discovery under US law is extremely expensive, and threatens to make 
cost-minded defendants settle. This is often the case when a claimant has 
little evidence and still gets permission to launch a wide discovery, 
incurring huge cost on the defendant.
56
However, in an article from 2013 in 
the Georgia Law Review, the authors claim that there is not enough 
evidence to suggest that private enforcement are an inefficient way of 
dealing with competition infringements. It is the only way for victims to 
claim compensation, and works good as deterrence because of the large
sums awarded.
57
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3 Private enforcement in the 
EU
3.1 The aim of EU competition 
enforcement
EU competition law is enforced by two mechanisms, public and private 
enforcement. Public enforcement has been the dominant solution to end 
competition infringements
58
, consisting of the European Commission and 
NCA issuing fines and ending infringements.
59
In the new Commission 
directive proposal, private enforcement is stated to be an important part of
the enforcement system, but the rules regarding the area have so far been 
limited.
60
Public and private enforcement have slightly different aims, which is why 
they work best complementing each other. Public enforcement, the 
investigations and issuing of fines, work as deterrence and the fines are not 
going to the victims of the infringement, but into public budgets.
61
Private 
enforcement instead aims at compensating victims of a specific competition 
infringement, and therefore does not have deterrence as major aim.
62
Despite the Commission’s statement that private enforcement is an 
important part of the enforcement system, there has been a clear notion from 
the start of the work with the new directive that public enforcement will 
keep its dominant role even after the directive has been adapted.
63
The 
public enforcement work is seen as extremely important for discovery of 
new competition infringements, and the argument has been made that 
without public enforcement there will be no cases for private enforcement as 
public investigations help discover competition infringements. It is therefore 
vital to secure the attractiveness of public enforcement.
64
In a recent report, 
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the Commission stated that all fines under 2013 for cartels came from 
processes initiated by leniency applications.
65
3.2 Historical overview
The first case were private enforcement was acknowledged by the ECJ was 
the Courage v. Crehan case
66
, where the Court stated that an individual 
could rely on TFEU art 101 to claim damages for competition 
infringements.
67
The Commission responded to the case by letting the law 
firm Ashurst do a comparative study
68
of the state of private enforcement in 
the Member States.
69
The study concluded that private enforcement 
legislation in the Member States lacked a uniform approach, and was 
“underdeveloped”.
70
After seeing the results from Ashurst’s study, the Commission prepared a 
green paper
71
on the subject. The green paper concluded that public and 
private enforcement have the same aim, to protect consumers and business 
from harm arising from competition law infringements, and looked into the 
main legal problems of the area.
72
The green paper was well discussed, and 
the Commission had in the autumn of 2006 received 147 submissions, 
commenting on its proposals.
73
In 2006, the ECJ expanded its case law concerning private enforcement in 
the Manfredi case
74
where the Court stated what kind of damages 
compensation would include.
75
In 2008, the Commission published a white paper,
76
making policy 
proposals in a lot of the problematic areas concerning private enforcement. 
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A directive proposal
77
was then adopted by the Commission in June 2013 
and has now been agreed upon between the European Parliament and the 
Council.
78
3.3 The possibilities open for victims
injured by a competition infringement
A victim suffered from a competition infringement has three alternatives 
how to proceed with the compensation claim. Firstly, he can turn to the 
Commission and try to make it investigate the matter.
79
Secondly, the victim 
can complain to a NCA, and try to make the NCA open investigations.
80
After the Commission or the NCA have found the matter to constitute a 
breach of competition law, the victim can go to a national court and claim 
compensation, in a so called follow-on action.
81
The third option is to turn to 
a national court directly and claim compensation, filing a stand-alone action.
In order to be successful with a private enforcement action, the victim has 
firstly to show that there has been a breach of competition law. The burden 
of proof rests solely on the victim to show that such an infringement has 
occurred.
82
Secondly, the victim has to prove he has suffered damages due 
to the infringement, and that there is causation between the infringement and 
the harm suffered. At each of these steps, the burden of proof weighs 
heavily upon the victim, and therefore a follow-on action is always easier
than a stand-alone action to carry out. This because in a follow-on action the 
victim can rely on the Commission’s or the NCA’s previous work proving 
the infringement.
3.4 Problematic areas in European private 
enforcement actions
The Ashurst report
83
prepared for the Commission
84
identified several areas 
problematic in regards to private enforcement. These areas were then 
discussed in the green and white papers, and many of the issues identified 
are being regulated by the new directive.
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Firstly, the Ashurst report pointed out that collective actions were almost 
never used in the Member States in private enforcements actions.
85
Secondly, damages rewarded in private enforcement were in most Member 
States compensatory, but some also awarded punitive damages. Third, some
Member States required an extra fault requirement, rather than just 
accepting the infringement itself as fault enough for damages. Fourth, NCA 
decisions regarding competition practices had different evidential value in 
different Member States, and the discovery process varied as well. 
Furthermore, the passing on defence were used differently, calculation of 
damages varied among the Member States and limitation periods could 
range from 1 to 30 years. Finally, the costs of the private enforcement action 
were also found to be hard to predict, as it was not fully recoverable.
86
All of these problems above held private enforcement back in the Member 
States. The Commission has since the report tried to harmonize the area by 
issuing guidelines
87
and recommendations
88
as well as the now approved 
directive. Questions regarding the calculation of damages and other 
problematic areas have thus largely been dealt with. Some of the remaining 
problematic areas were also dealt with in the below introduced council 
regulation 1/2003.
89
3.5 Current european legislation 
concerning private enforcement  
3.5.1 Courage v. Crehan
The ECJ’s first support of private enforcement came in a preliminary ruling 
in the English case Courage v. Crehan. The ECJ had earlier had the chance 
to look into private enforcement of competition law, but then found that the 
previous legislation in the area lacked direct effect, as in the case Banks v. 
British Coal in 1994.
90
In Courage v. Crehan, Mr Crehan was managing a bar he rented from 
Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd, owned by the brewery Courage and the catering 
company Grand Metropolitan. In addition to the rental agreement, Mr 
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Crehan also had to buy a fixed minimum quantity of beers from Courage. 
Two years into the agreement, Courage sued Crehan for unpaid beer 
deliveries. Mr Crehan defended himself stating that the beer tie agreement 
was in violation of TFEU art 101 and claimed compensation from Courage 
for the competition infringement.
91
However, under English law a party to 
an illegal agreement could not claim damages from another party, as 
competition rules was seen as protecting third parties, not the parties to an 
illegal agreement.
92
The English Court of Appeal
93
decided to ask for a preliminary ruling from 
the ECJ, if it was possible for a party to an illegal agreement to claim
damages arising from that agreement due to competition law infringement. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal asked if the English rule that stopped 
parties to an illegal agreement from claiming damages from each other was 
in accordance with EU law.
94
The ECJ first stated that European law added both restrictions and rights to 
individuals, arising from the Treaties.
95
Furthermore, TFEU art 101 
paragraph 2 that any prohibited agreements shall be void can be relied on by 
anyone.
96
The ECJ also stated that TFEU art 101 has direct effect between 
individuals and that national courts must uphold this. This also applies if an
individual is party to the contract breaching competition law.
97
The ECJ 
came to these conclusions since it would otherwise risk the effectiveness of 
TFEU art 101 if individuals could not use the article to demand 
compensation.
98
This is in line with the Francowich judgment.
99
The ECJ 
further stated that letting individuals claim damages based on TFEU art 101 
strengthened the competition rules and act as
deterrence for prohibited agreements.
100
However, the ECJ stated that in the absence of EU legislation on the matter, 
it was up to national courts to decide on procedural rules regarding 
competition claims, and make sure that those were no less favourable than 
domestic actions, according to the principle of equivalence. National rules 
can neither be of such nature that they render an action excessively difficult 
or practically impossible, according to the principle of effectiveness.
101
Furthermore, national courts may also ensure that EU law does not lead to 
unjust enrichment.
102
A national court can bar a party from claiming 
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damages if the party has distorted competition in a serious way himself. 
This arises from the principle that a party should not benefit from his own 
unlawful conduct. Conduct and negotiating strength should be decisive 
factors when examining this.
103
As stated above, the ECJ concluded that a party to a contract could still rely 
on competition infringement of that contract to claim damages, and any rule 
prohibiting this was in violation of EU law.
104
3.5.2 Manfredi and others
The ECJ further expanded the case law regarding private enforcement in the 
Manfredi judgment. The background was that Manfredi and others wanted 
compensation from insurance companies involved in unlawful cooperation, 
which had caused Manfredi and the other claimants to pay too high 
premiums on their insurances.
105
The insurance companies defended 
themselves by claiming that the Italian court in question
106
lacked 
jurisdiction under Italian law and that the claimants had brought the lawsuit
too late.
107
The Italian court decided to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling first
concerning if TFEU art 101 could be infringed at the same time as national 
competition law had been breached. Secondly, the Italian court asked if 
TFEU art 101 allowed third parties who had suffered damages due to a 
breach of the article to sue for compensation, if the third parties could show 
causal relationship between the infringement and the harm. Third, the ECJ 
was asked if limitation periods for claiming compensation based on TFEU 
art 101 should start counting from the formation of the unlawful cooperation 
or counting from the time the unlawful cooperation ceased. Fourth, the 
Italian court asked if punitive damages could be decided by the court, in 
addition to the compensation awarded to the claimants for suffered loss.
108
Furthermore, the Italian court wanted to know if Italian legislation 
concerning competent court was allowed according to EU law. 
109
The ECJ stated that EU competition law applies alongside with national 
law. This since EU law concerns the implications to trade between Member 
States and national legislation secures competition only in the Member State 
concerned.
110
EU competition law can only be used when trade between 
Member States may be affected as stated in TFEU art 101, and in doing this 
assessment several factors are important and the fact that an unlawful
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cooperation involves members from different countries may be one of the 
factors considered.
111
The ECJ also stated that any individual that suffered harm from an unlawful 
cooperation where there is a casual relationship between the infringement 
and the injury may claim damages. The procedural rules for such a claim are 
up to national legal system to decide.
112
In the lack of EU rules governing 
competent court for competition infringement actions, it is also up to 
national legislation to secure that those claims receive the same treatment as 
other actions, according to the principle of equivalence. Furthermore, the 
national systems may not make it practically impossible or excessively 
difficult to claim a right derived from EU law according to the principle of 
effectiveness.
113
The principles of equivalence and effectiveness also apply to the question 
about limitation periods. If the limitation period for bringing an action for 
compensation due to competition infringement starts to count from the time 
the unlawful cooperation begins, then it could be difficult to bring a claim 
before the limitation period runs out. This would threaten to make it 
excessively difficult to obtain compensation.
114
Regarding punitive damages, the ECJ stated that it is also up to the domestic 
legal systems to decide if these kinds of damages should be awarded, as 
long as the principle of equivalence is upheld.
115
Damages that always can be claimed by a victim of a competition 
infringement include, according to the ECJ, compensation for actual loss 
and loss of profit, as well as interest.
116
3.5.3 Council Regulation 1/2003
With Regulation 1/2003 that entered into force 1 May 2004, the EU dealt 
with some of the problems concerning private enforcement.
117
However, the 
biggest change with the regulation was the abolishment of the notification 
system where the Commission had been able to review contracts’ 
compliance with competition law.
118
With the new regulation, national 
courts were suddenly competent to review contracts under the TFEU art 
101(3) exception, and the thought was that the Commission could spend its 
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limited resources on investigating competition infringements instead of 
reviewing contracts.
119
Regulation 1/2003 brought a more decentralized use of EU competition law, 
as national courts and NCA expressively got the competence of using the 
whole TFEU art 101 and art 102 in individual cases.
120
However, the ECJ 
had already stated that TFEU art 101 and 102 had direct effect between 
individuals in the BRT v. Sabam case.
121
Even though the regulation contain articles important to private 
enforcement, such as art 16 where national courts cannot rule counter to 
Commission decisions, the regulation does not directly mention anything 
about using competition law to claim damages.
122
Still, having art 16 
together with the Masterfood
123
judgment, where the ECJ stated that a 
national court should stay proceedings if a Commission decision was 
appealed, is hugely beneficial in a private enforcement follow-on action.
  
3.5.4 Commission Communication on 
quantifying harm in antitrust damages 
actions
Another part of the Commission’s work to make private enforcement more 
appealing for victims is the communication on quantifying harm in antitrust 
damages actions
124
, published in June 2013. The reason for this 
communication was the need for guidance to national courts how to estimate 
damages suffered from competition infringements. Estimation of damages 
was one of the problems encountered in the Ashurst report
125
and the 
Commission stated that the damage estimation is often expensive and hard 
to succeed with, making the area vital to promote private enforcement.
126
The Commission’s communication states that compensation shall be made 
up by actual loss and loss profit, as stated in the Manfredi judgment. 
Furthermore, the Commission states that it is up to national courts to lay 
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down detailed rules about the compensation claim and while doing so, 
safeguard that the rules does not make the claim excessively difficult or 
practically impossible to succeed with. National rules shall also comply with 
the principle of equivalence.
127
3.5.5 Collective redress
Currently, the only uniform legislation on EU level concerning collective 
redress is the Commission’s soft law recommendation from 2013.
128
The 
new directive does not contain any rules on the matter, even though the 
European Parliament was positive towards incorporating rules about 
collective redress in the directive. Making collective redress possible would 
enable consumers and smaller companies to claim compensation even 
though their individual losses are small.
129
Already the Ashurst study noticed the lack of possibilities to form collective
actions in some EU Member States. The study made a difference between 
on one hand “class actions,” that provided unidentified individuals with 
redress, and on the other hand “collective claims” that provided redress for 
an identified group of individuals.
130
Even though many Member States 
claimed they had “class actions,” their systems were nothing close to the US 
one.
131
The study suggested a more uniformed approach and introduction of 
a system closer to the US one in order to spread risks and costs of 
litigation.
132
The green paper also distinguished a “collective action” from an “opt-out 
action,” where an action involves unidentified claimants.
133
The green paper 
gave two policy options; one featuring consumer organizations being able to 
commence a collective action and the other to feature opt-in actions for 
others than consumers.
134
In the white paper it was noted that some commentators rejected the green 
paper’s proposals on collective redress altogether, as it would increase cost 
for businesses and lead to an excessive system. However, other 
commentators pushed the view that a collective redress system was needed 
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on an EU level.
135
The white paper suggested a system where qualified 
entities such as consumer associations could bring opt-in class actions.
136
This would constitute what the green paper called “collective action”. Later 
in 2008, another green paper stated that safeguards concerning collective 
actions were needed, in order to prevent abuses.
137
The Commission had 
ideas for proposing a directive on collective redress, including the much 
discussed opt-out model. However, these plans were scrapped because the 
Member States did not agree. Instead, the Commission took a soft law 
approach.
138
The Commission’s recommendation states that private enforcement under 
competition law is one area where collective redress is an important tool.
139
However, the recommendation was followed by a Commission 
communication stating that even though the recommendation encouraged all 
Member States to have a system of collective redress in private enforcement 
matters, it is ultimate up to the Member State themselves if they want to 
allow this in their national law.
140
The Commission’s recommendation proposes Member States to let only 
non-profit entities conduct collective actions.
141
Collective actions should 
also work on “opt-in” bases.
142
Member States are suggested to ban 
contingency fees for legal counsels
143
in order not to create incentives for 
collective actions.
144
Punitive damages should also be prohibited
145
and 
follow-on actions should only start after public enforcement has ended.
146
3.5.6 Access to documents held by the
Commission and NCA
It is not only in the US private enforcement actions the defendant has a huge 
advantage by having all the documentations in its possession. This poses a 
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serious problem within the EU as well. Furthermore, if a claimant is 
preparing a follow-on action, competition authorities will hold important 
documents.
147
These rules concerning access to documents are subject to 
major changes in the new directive, and concerning leniency application 
documents the rules will be completely overhauled.
148
However, it is still 
meaningful to present it here as it explains the policy choices taken by the 
Commission in the directive.
3.5.6.1 Documents held by the Commission
The rules concerning access to documents generated within the EU
institutions are found in Regulation no 1049/2001. Art 2(1) state that any 
individual living in the Union, and any legal entity incorporated there, shall 
have access to documents held by the EU. However, there is an exception 
that an institution can refuse access to some documents in art 4. Art 4(2) 
states that an institution shall refuse access if a disclosure would harm the 
protection of commercial interest or intellectual property, court proceedings 
or legal advice, the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, and the 
public interest does not override the refusal ground.
149
The Commission often tries to deny access to documents generated in its 
anti-infringement work. Especially, the Commission protects the leniency 
applications and documents relating to immunity for companies that have 
helped in the discovery of a competition law breach, in order to secure the 
appeal of filing for leniency.
150
Companies would not find a leniency 
procedure as attractive, if all the documents where the company admits guilt 
and describes the cartel would end up in the hands of customers or suppliers 
filing a private enforcement action. This would hurt the public enforcement 
procedure and in the end lead to the discovery of fewer cartels.
In the CDC Hydrogene Peroxide v. Commission case,
151
CDC Hydrogene 
Peroxide wanted access to the index of the Commission’s file concerning 
investigation of several companies in the hydrogen peroxide market.
152
The 
Commission denied access, based on that the index was not a document 
within the definition of Regulation 1049/2001 art 3, and if it constituted a 
document, then allow access to that file would undermine business 
interest.
153
CDC Hydrogene Peroxide sued for annulment of the 
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Commission’s decision.
154
The General Court stated that the index was a 
document that could be accessed, and that the index itself did not contain 
any information that could harm business interest of the companies 
concerned. Thus, the court allowed access.
155
3.5.6.2 Documents held by a NCA
Documents necessary as evidence in a private enforcement action can also 
be held by NCA. In the Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt case,
156
Pfleiderer 
wanted access to documents concerning the fining of companies in the décor 
paper sector, held by the German NCA Bundeskartellamt.
157
Bundeskartellamt rejected Pfleiderer’s request concerning some documents 
concerning leniency applications, and Pfleiderer took the case to court.
158
The German court Amtsgericht Bonn referred the question to the ECJ if it 
was possible to deny access to documents concerning leniency held by a 
NCA.
159
The ECJ concluded that leniency programmes were important tools 
in order to discover competition infringements.
160
Furthermore, the ECJ 
stated that by allowing access to leniency files, the attractiveness of those 
programs would be put in jeopardy.
161
However, the right for victims to 
claim compensation through private enforcement is also important, and 
strengthens the EU competition legislation.
162
The ECJ again leaned on the 
principle of equivalence and the principle of effectiveness and concluded
that national rules regarding access to documents cannot be less favourable 
than for domestic actions. Neither can national rules make it practically 
impossible or excessively difficult to succeed with a private enforcement 
claim.
163
National courts have to weigh the interests of the leniency 
applicants against the interests of the victims of a cartel on case-by-case 
basis when deciding if a document shall be disclosed.
164
The national court 
Amtsgericht later denied Pfleiderer access after finding that the authority 
inspections would not be efficient if the documents were disclosed.
165
In another case before the ECJ, the court reviewed the Austrian law on 
access to documents held by the Austrian NCA. According to Austrian 
legislation, the file concerning leniency could only be disclosed if all 
companies contained in the file agreed.
166
According to Austrian law no 
weighing of the interests was possible,
167
and of course the companies who 
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had breached competition law and whose names were in the file, had no 
interest of allowing it to be disclosed to parties planning a private 
enforcement claim against them. The ECJ firstly stated the necessity of 
weighing the parties’ interests against each other, as a general access to the 
file or a general denial would either hurt the public enforcement or the 
private enforcement.
168
An automatic denial of access to the file would 
possibly rob victims of their right to compensation.
169
The ECJ concluded 
that according to the Pfleiderer case a weighing of the interests had to be 
done on a case-by-case basis
170
and the rule where the parties in the leniency 
file could bar a disclosure was against EU law and the principle of 
effectiveness.
171
3.6 The role of the Commission and NCA 
as Amicus Curiae in private 
enforcement
According to regulation 1/2003 art 15(1), national courts may ask for the 
Commission’s opinion concerning EU competition legislation. The 
Commission and NCA may also on their own initiative submit Amicus 
briefs to national courts with their opinions according to art 15(3). When 
appearing before a national court the Commission or a NCA does not 
support any of the parties directly, but their opinions may support a party’s 
claim. 
In the Commission notice
172
on the procedure, it is noted that the 
Commission may submit opinions to a national court
173
that are non-
binding.
174
The Commission will not hear the parties before issuing its 
opinion in order to secure the independence of the national courts
175
and its 
opinion will only cover legal or economic issues.
176
If parties contact the 
Commission in matters pending before a national court, the Commission 
will notify the national court about this, even if parties contacted the 
Commission before a national court sought advice from the Commission.
177
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The Commission has intervened as Amicus Curiae in compliance with
regulation 15(3) ten times according to the Commission website.
178
None of 
the cases directly involves private enforcement matters, but in 2011 the 
Commission made an opinion in the National Grid case before the High 
Court of the United Kingdom. The Commission’s opinion concerned the 
disclosure of leniency documents in the wake of the Pfleiderer judgment.
179
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4 The New Directive 
4.1 In general
In June 2013 the Commission put forward the proposal for a directive ”on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the Union”. Legal bases were both TFEU art 103, since the directive aimed 
to give effect to the principles contained in TFEU art 101 and art 102 and 
TFEU art 114, since different rules in different Member States threatened
coherence in the internal market.
180
The work order was ordinary legislative 
procedure with co-decision. The text of the directive has been agreed upon 
by the European Parliament and the Council, as well as voted through by the 
European Parliament.
181
The directive proposal as well as the agreed text, contains the notion that 
public enforcement is vital to uphold EU competition law, and thus should 
private enforcement only be used as a compliment. Because of this, the 
directive aims to secure that the interests of the two branches of enforcement 
do not collide. Furthermore, the compensational aspect of private 
enforcement claims is important for the EU, not using private enforcement 
primarily as deterrence.
182
The focus on compensation instead of deterrence is also important in the 
proportionality assessment for the proposal. The Commission stated that its 
proposal passes the test since multiple damages and opt-out class actions 
have been abandoned.
183
As stated in the white paper, the policy choices are 
balanced measures rooted in European legal culture, where public 
enforcement is the dominant way of dealing with competition 
infringements.
184
In general, the white paper contains all the solution chosen 
in the directive, and the goals of a balanced approach between public and 
private enforcement as well as between infringer and victim are preserved.
Some areas have been left out of the directive proposal that were addressed 
in the green and white paper. The green paper included an option if special 
rules were required to minimize the risk for the claimant, by introducing a 
similar situation as in the US, where an unsuccessful claimant will only be 
liable for the legal costs of the defendant in the case of bringing a frivolous 
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suit.
185
In the white paper, the Commission only stated that the Member 
States should reflect on how the cost of a suit is distributed, as private 
enforcement actions may be costlier than regular civil action suits. The 
“loser pays” principle used in the Member States, with the aim of 
discouraging frivolous claims, may also have drawbacks as it also imposes 
great risks on claimants with legitimate claims.
186
The subject of fault 
requirement is another thing the directive is silent on, while it was brought 
up in the green and white papers. In the white paper, the Commission only 
stated to the Member States that requiring additional fault to be proven, 
beyond the fact that EU competition law has been breach, may be contrary 
to the principle of effectiveness.
187
     
The European Parliament expressed satisfaction with the general outline of 
the original directive proposal. However, the rapporteurs from the different 
Committees proposed a lot of changes, and individual Members of 
Parliament also submitted statements to be discussed below.
188
The Council supported the idea that a uniform approach in the area was
needed, in order to secure the internal market. Otherwise, the Council stated, 
could defendants established in a Member State with generous private 
enforcement legislation be worse off than if the establishment had been in a 
Member State lacking relevant rules all together.
189
In the final text the major areas corresponds to the original proposal, with 
some mostly minor changes. The adopted text also contains some new ideas, 
not discussed during the preparation phase but instead added during the 
negotiation phase between the institutions. 
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4.2 The contents of the directive and 
policy choices made
4.2.1 Scope and definitions, art 1- 4
The directive starts with scope and definitions.
190
Art 1 states that the 
directive is to assure that victims of a competition infringement receive full 
compensation. Furthermore, the directive will safeguard equal protection for 
victims in the EU. The directive also aims to coordinate private and public 
enforcement.
191
The Commission stated that the directive is important 
because it gives the same procedural rules for private enforcement actions 
under TFEU art 101 and art 102, as under national competition law, when a 
NCA have to apply EU law parallel to national law.
192
A NCA have to apply 
art 101 and art 102 parallel with national laws when the investigated action 
may affect trade between Member States.
193
Art 2 states that any individual who suffered harm due to a competition 
infringement shall have standing. This follows the Courage v. Crehan 
judgment and allows indirect purchasers to claim compensation.
194
Art 2 
also contains the scope of the compensation that should be awarded in a 
private enforcement action. The ECJ Manfredi judgment has prevailed and 
full compensation includes actual loss and loss of profits, as well as 
interest.
195
In the green paper, there was a suggestion of double damages for 
horizontal cartels, but this has not left an impact on the directive.
196
Art 3 contains the two principles stated by the ECJ to be of importance in 
private enforcement actions, the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence.
197
The principle of effectiveness was stated in the Courage v. Crehan case as 
important when national courts review a private enforcement action. The 
principle states that national rules cannot make it “practically impossible or 
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excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Community law.”
198
This means that national rules cannot hinder effective judicial protection of 
EU rights and is now found in the EU charter of fundamental rights art 47. 
TEU art 19(1) also contains the notion that Member States shall ensure 
effective legal protection. 
The principle of effectiveness has two effects. The negative effect is that 
national authorities and courts cannot use national rules when they are not in 
line with the principle. The positive effect means that national rules cannot 
be used in such a way that EU rights are made practically impossible or 
excessively difficult.
199
In a private enforcement context this means that national rules cannot deny 
standing to claimants who suffered harm, limitation periods cannot be too 
short for a claimant to sue for compensation and the burden of proof cannot 
be set to high for such claims. Furthermore, in the Manfredi judgment, some 
authors mean that the ECJ used the principle in order to accomplish 
minimum harmonization of procedural rules.
200
The principle of equivalence, also referred to in the Courage v. Crehan case, 
means that rights transferred from the EU cannot be treated less favorable 
than rights derived from national laws.
201
4.2.2 Disclosure of evidence, art 5-8
One of the major changes with the directive concerns the disclosure of 
evidence. After the Pfleiderer judgment, the Commission was afraid that the 
leniency programme would be in danger if the documents were made 
available to victims preparing private enforcement claims.
202
Already in the 
green paper the importance of the leniency programs as a tool to discover 
cartels was noted.
203
The green paper presented an option were an injured party could request any 
document from the Commission, except for the leniency application and 
documents concerning business secrets. Furthermore, national courts were 
suggested to be able to request documents from the Commission, as long as 
the Commission could refuse if Union interests overrode the request.
204
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These options are fairly close to what the directive contains. Another 
suggestion in the green paper was that leniency applicants would get 
discounts in follow-on actions.
205
However, the Commission stated that 
immunity from fines, does not make a company immune from private 
claims, and there is a limit to how much the Commission was prepared to 
protect leniency applicants from private claims.
206
In the white paper, many commentators put forward a wish that disclosure 
procedures would not enable “fishing expeditions,” and that high costs 
concerning discovery should not encourage defendants to settle.
207
This has 
been taken note of in point 21 of the preamble of the adopted text where the 
search for information that is unlikely to be of any relevance for the parties 
should be warded against.
The directive introduces a discovery system when it comes to documents of 
interest in private enforcement claims. Art 5 of the directive states that if a 
claimant can show a “reasoned justification containing reasonable and 
available facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of its
claims,” then national courts can order the defendant or a third party to 
disclose evidence. This part of the article has been subject to some changes 
in wording between the original proposal and the final text. Furthermore, 
according to the final text, a claimant has to show that the evidence is 
relevant for the claim, and specify it as narrowly as he can. Courts shall 
review that a disclosure is proportional in regard of the interests of the 
concerned, especially looking at the cost and scope of the disclosure, 
confidential information in the documents, if there is a likely competition 
infringement and if authorities have investigated the infringement before. 
Moreover, national courts shall be able to issue protective measures of 
sensitive information and the rules concern all types of evidence.
208
Art 6 of the directive presents the exceptions to the disclosure regime. 
Leniency statements and settlement submissions can never be disclosed to a 
claimant. Furthermore, information that was prepared for proceedings of a 
competition authority, as well as withdrawn settlements submissions and 
information created by a competition authority, may only be disclosed after 
such proceedings are finished. The article introduces a “black list” made up 
by the documents regarding leniency and settlements, and a “grey list” made 
up by documents created for a public enforcement procedure that can only 
be disclosed afterwards. Documents from a competition authority can only 
be disclosed if they cannot be reasonable provided by a party or a third 
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party. This has been an amendment to the final text and was not present in 
the Commission’s proposal.
209
Art 7 of the directive states that Member States shall provide that documents 
on the “grey list” are not allowed in private enforcement claims until the 
public enforcement proceeding is completed, and that documents on the 
“black list” are never allowed as evidence. However, this will only be the 
case if this evidence has been provided to a claimant only through access to 
a competition authority’s file.
Art 8 introduces sanctions if a defendant or third party refuse to comply 
with the disclosure. Destruction of documents is also prohibited. Member 
States shall make sure that the sanctions are effective, proportional and 
dissuasive.
With these new rules on disclosure of evidence, the Commission wants to 
mimic the system of disclosure used in Directive 2004/48/EC
210
and balance 
cost and scope of the regime in order to avoid abuses. Necessity and 
proportionality are central for the national courts when deciding if a 
disclosure is necessary. The public enforcement receives necessary 
safeguards to secure its popularity and global disclosure is discouraged by 
letting the claimant construct the disclosure narrowly.
211
In the preparatory phase, the Committee on Economic and Monetary affairs 
stated that a per se protection of some documents would be a breach of 
primary EU law, stated by the ECJ in the Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie 
judgments. Such protection would be too extensive and, according to the 
draft report, not respected by national courts.
212
The Committee instead 
proposed a system where national courts could disclose leniency application 
documents under some circumstances.
213
The Committee on Legal Affairs 
would also wanted a more proportional access to the leniency files, and 
rejected the mandatory exclusion of leniency documents.
214
Individual 
Members of Parliament also proposed that only the first leniency application 
should be protected and that the annexes to such an application should be 
possible to disclose. This since the leniency application with annexes could 
contain information important to a claimant deciding whether to go to court 
or settle.
215
None of these opinions made by the Parliament led to any 
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changes in the final text, which contains only minor changes in practice 
compared to the Commission’s original proposal, even though the text in the 
articles have been changed. The Council noticed that evidence is often held 
by the infringing party, and welcomed the new discovery system. National 
courts should keep the system under strict control to avoid abuses.
216
The 
Council also stated that the exceptions in the directive proposal were well 
balanced to keep the attractiveness of the leniency programme.
217
The changes in practice made to the final text compared to the 
Commission’s original proposal include an addition that the interest of the 
infringing party to avoid damages should not be an interest taken into 
account in the proportionality test when deciding if documents could be 
disclosed, and that a competition authority only should disclose document if 
no other party have this possibility.   
4.2.3 Effect of NCA decisions, art 9
The directive states that in private enforcement actions, national courts 
should not be able to take decisions running counter that final decision taken 
by a NCA or a review court. However, in the final text only decisions taken 
by a national authority have this effect. Decisions from other Member States 
may be presented as any other evidence.
218
This provision mimics regulation 
1/2003 art 16, where national courts cannot take decisions running counter
to a Commission decision. In the Commission’s original proposal, the 
binding effect was extended to include a decision from any NCA within the 
Union.
The Commission stated that it is reasonable to extend the rule from 
regulation 1/2003 to include NCA decisions as well. If a defendant could 
start every private enforcement action with the defence that a competition 
infringement have not occurred, it would lead to increased legal uncertainty, 
increased cost of the litigation and inefficiencies in the procedure.
219
With 
the new provision, a NCA decision would constitute irrebuttable proof that 
an infringement occurred, making a follow-on action for compensation 
easier. The idea of this provision was introduced in the white paper and 
aimed to restrict multiplying litigation over the same questions.
220
In the European Parliament resolution to the white paper, the Parliament 
rejected the idea that national courts should be bound by a decision taken by 
a NCA in another Member State.
221
The Council shared this opinion. In the 
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Council’s general approach, it proposed that decisions taken by a NCA from 
another Member State than the court in a private enforcement action, should
only be presented as normal evidence, and not be seen as irrefutable proof of 
an infringement. National courts should not be bound by decisions taken by 
a NCA from another Member State.
222
Furthermore, the Council stated that 
decisions taken by NCA should only matter in private enforcement actions 
concerning the same “material, personal, temporal and territorial scope” as 
the decision.
223
Interestingly, the European Parliament’s Committees did not 
raise this concern during the preparatory phase, and thereby did not follow 
the approach taken after the white paper. Rather, the Committees would
have liked to see amendments made to the article stating the procedural 
rights of a party. If the NCA decision had been taken contrary to the right of 
fair trial, right of defence or other rights, the decision should not be binding 
upon the court, the Committees proposed.
224
According to the final text, it is clear that the ideas of the Council prevailed, 
making only national decisions binding for a court, where decisions from 
other Member States may be presented only as prima facie evidence. The 
Parliament’s suggestions left no mark upon the final article.
225
4.2.4 Limitation periods, art 10
According to the directive, limitation periods shall not start to count until 
the victim knows, or could reasonably be expected to know of the 
infringement. Furthermore, the victim must have known that an action 
constituted an infringement, that he suffered harm from it, and whom is the 
infringer causing the harm, in order for the limitation period to start 
counting. Moreover, the limitation period shall not start running until an 
infringement has ended. If these conditions are met, the limitation period is
5 years, and the period shall be suspended if public enforcement authorities 
investigate the matter.
226
The Commission states that 5 years is needed in order for the injured party 
to be able to claim compensation.
227
The decision that limitation period 
should start counting when the infringement ends is important for injured 
parties suffered from repeated infringements and suspending the time limit 
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when public enforcement authorities investigate the matter make it easier for 
follow-on claims.
228
The European Parliament’s Committees proposed different time limits, but 
stated that it should be long enough to allow access to justice.
229
      
The Council agreed with the directive proposal but preferred 3 years and 
added that Member States should decide the absolute limitation periods 
themselves, as long as the principle of effectiveness is adhered.
230
4.2.5 Joint and several liability, art 11
Art 11 of the directive states that if undertakings breach competition law 
jointly, they shall each be liable for the whole damage caused to the victims. 
An injured party can turn to anyone of the infringers for compensation.
There are two exceptions to this.
231
The first exception is if an undertaking has been granted immunity from 
fines by the Commission or a NCA under a leniency programme. An 
undertaking with immunity shall only be liable for damages to its own direct 
purchasers and indirect purchasers, if other victims are able to claim 
compensation from the other infringers. However, if other victims are not 
able to claim compensation from the co-infringers, then the undertaking 
with the immunity shall be responsible to compensate, as a secondary target 
for private enforcement actions. Member States shall then according to the 
directive secure that an infringing party can receive compensation from its 
co-infringers and share the costs in relation to what responsibility and harm 
an individual party caused. Again, an undertaking in a leniency program 
shall not be liable for more damages than that to its own purchasers and 
indirect purchasers. Furthermore, if a leniency program participant caused 
damage to other than its direct and indirect purchasers, it shall only 
contribute for the part of the damage caused by its own behaviour.
232
Joint 
liability with exception for a leniency participant was suggested as early as 
in the green paper in order to secure the attractiveness of the system with 
immunity.
233
In the directive proposal the Commission stated that it was
vital to protect the leniency programmes, as they are important to discover 
new cartels. There is a big problem that leniency applicants who have 
helped the Commission to investigate a cartel are less likely to appeal an
infringement decision, thus making their infringement decision final before 
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the other cartel members, making them a first target for private enforcement 
claims. The Commission therefore tried to balance the attractiveness of the 
leniency programme against the right of the victims to get full 
compensation. The solution to make lenience applicants debtor of last resort 
is therefore according to the Commission a practical solution.
234
The second exception to joint and several liability concerns small and 
medium-sized enterprises,
235
with fewer than 250 employees and a turnover 
below 50 million euro or an annual balance sheet below 43 million euro. 
Such companies may be exempted if its market share was below 5 % at any 
time during the infringement and joint and several liability would put its 
economic viability at risk and cause its assets to lose all of its value. 
However, this exception is not allowed if the company led the infringement, 
made others participate or previously infringed competition law. This 
exception regarding small and medium sized companies was added in the 
final text, and has not been mentioned at all during the preparatory phase. 
During the preparatory phase, the Parliament’s Committees supported the 
idea of protecting the leniency applicants, but in the same time did not want 
to put the victim’s right to compensation in jeopardy.
236
The Council argued
that there should be no limitation periods when bringing a private 
enforcement claim against the leniency applicant as a last resort debtor.
237
In 
the final text, it is noted that the limitation period should be sufficient to 
allow for injured parties to bring such secondary claims.
238
4.2.6 Passing-on of overcharges, art 12-16
Legal standing and the possibility of the passing on defence is another major 
aspect in the directive. Already the green paper noted that determining to 
what extent an overcharge by a cartel had been passed on from direct 
purchasers to indirect purchasers would be both costly and requiring 
advanced economic models. Calculating a total overcharge by a cartel is 
difficult enough, yet doing it to every layer of purchasers would be even 
more complex and costly.
239
The possibility of using the passing on defence 
has been allowed in other fields of EU law, as in the case Société 
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Comateb.
240
In that case, dock levies had been paid by companies to France, 
contrary to EU law. When the companies wanted the levies back the French 
government defended itself by saying that the companies had suffered no 
harm, as they had passed the levy on to their customers.
241
The ECJ agreed 
and stated that repaying the levies to the companies would constitute unjust 
enrichment of those who had already passed the levy down to their own 
customers.
242
Had the levies been only partly passed on, then the amount 
borne by the companies should be subject to repayment by France.
243
The Green Paper also cited Courage v. Crehan, where the ECJ stated that 
national courts could take measures to prevent unjust enrichment, which 
would allow the passing on defence.
244
However, in the ECJ´s Weber 
judgment the Court held that the principle of effectiveness would hinder 
Member States from adopting a presumption that it would be unjust 
enrichment only because a cost had been passed on.
245
Also, a company 
who passes an overcharge on would potentially lose volume of sales 
because of pricier goods which also constitutes injury.
246
The green paper also stated that the ECJ had not adopted any scenario 
concerning the passing on defence and standing of indirect purchasers in its 
competition law case law. However, in the ECJ statement in Courage v. 
Crehan the Court talked about “any individual who suffered harm”
247
which 
could be interpreted as the Court giving legal standing to indirect 
purchasers.
248
The questions concerning allowing the passing on defence and admitting 
indirect purchasers legal standing are closely linked. If the defence of 
passing on is allowed, then indirect purchasers must have legal standing to 
file a private enforcement action. Otherwise, companies who invoke the 
passing on defence towards their direct purchasers would be unjustly 
enriched if the indirect purchaser could not claim compensation.
The green paper gave different options whether or not to allow the passing 
on defence and allow legal standing of indirect purchasers. One option was 
identical to the US federal law, to exclude the passing on defence, and not 
allow indirect purchasers standing, while another was the opposite; to allow 
both the passing on defence and indirect purchasers right to claim 
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compensation. A third option, to not allow the passing on defence, and still 
let both direct and indirect purchasers claim compensation, was proposed 
but the Commission admitted this would lead to overcompensation.
249
In the white paper, the commentators of the green paper were said to be very 
concerned about the unjust enrichment aspect. Many raised the concern that 
if the passing on defence was allowed, then indirect purchasers would have 
such trouble to prove their harm that they would not claim compensation 
anyway. However, if the passing on defence was prohibited, then direct 
purchasers would be unjustly enriched, if they had in fact passed the 
overcharge on.
250
The white paper concluded that overcompensation should 
be avoided as much as under compensation.
251
Despite the complexity and 
cost of investigation the Commission suggested that the passing on defence 
should be allowed, combined with legal standing for indirect purchasers, as 
it was the option mostly aimed at full compensation to injured parties.
252
In the directive, the Commission’s original line of thought from the white 
paper is kept and expands on the idea that compensation is the main 
thought. In art 12 the passing-on defence is allowed and indirect purchasers 
are allowed legal standing in claims for compensation.
253
The burden of proof to which extent an overcharge has been passed on lies 
with the defendant if it is invoked as a defence in an action arising from a 
direct purchaser as stated in art 13. However, in an action brought by an 
indirect purchaser, the burden of proof concerning the existence of passing 
on instead lay with the claimant as it is now used as an offence.
254
The 
claimant has proven the passing-on if three provisions are fulfilled; the 
defendant has breached competition law, the competition infringement led 
to an overcharge for the direct purchaser and the indirect purchasers bought 
products involved in the infringement from the direct purchaser. Fulfilling 
these three criteria leads to the burden of proof instead being transferred to 
the defendant to rebut the presumption.
255
According to article 15, national courts shall assess the action in the light of 
other such actions arising from the same infringement, and other such 
judgments as well as relevant information within the public domain. This in 
order to avoid over- or under compensation at any level of the supply 
chain.
256
In the directive proposal, the Commission explained its policy choice by 
saying that the party who suffered harm should be the one receiving 
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compensation. Furthermore, even if a direct purchaser has passed an 
overcharge on, the extra price likely results in a loss of sales that also would 
be subject to compensation. Suppliers to a cartel may also be harmed if the 
cartel cooperates when buying products.
257
The Commission also proposed a safety valve, that if the overcharge had
been passed on to an entity for which it would be legally impossible to 
claim compensation, then the passing on defence would be prohibited.
258
  
This as national rules on causation may sometimes stop an indirect 
purchaser from bringing a claim.
259
The European Parliament was more hesitant to this approach. The 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs meant that the exception 
when the passing on defence is prohibited for a defender to use was too 
vague and may lead to possible overcompensation for a purchaser. 
Furthermore, such national legislation preventing indirect purchasers 
claiming damages would breach EU law in the Courage v. Crehan case.
260
This opinion was shared by the Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection.
261
As a result, this exception has been taken out of the 
final text.
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs was also critical of the 
three criteria according to which an indirect purchaser is said to have proven 
the passing-on. The fact that an indirect purchaser bought products involved 
in a competition infringement does not prove that an overcharge has 
occurred, and the Committee thought the level of evidence needed is 
insufficient.
262
The Council agreed with the Commission’s proposal. The rebuttable notion 
that an indirect purchaser has suffered injury if he has bought products 
subject to a competition infringement was well constructed according to the 
Council, since consumers and indirect purchasers may have a hard time 
proving causation.
263
According to art 16, the Commission should issue guidelines on how to 
estimate the share of overcharge passed on to indirect purchasers.
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4.2.7 Quantification of harm, art 17
In the directive, national courts are given the competence to estimate the 
amount of harm arising from the competition infringement. It is also 
presumed that cartel infringements causes harm.
265
The Commission stated that proving and quantifying the harm done by a 
cartel is often costly and difficult to prove. In order to help an injured party 
with his claim the presumption of harm in the case of a cartel is therefore 
introduced. According to a study for the Commission
266
9 out of 10 cartels 
causes illegal overcharge, and this is a sufficient number to create the
presumption rule in the directive. The Commission also argued that the 
evidence to rebut such a presumption that the cartel caused harm is already 
in the hands of the defenders. It is therefore more cost-efficient to make the 
defenders responsible to prove that their illegal cartel caused no harm rather 
than having the claimant have the burden of proof. The right for national 
courts to estimate the harm caused will also, according to the Commission, 
increase the chance that victims will receive compensation.
267
Some Members of the European Parliament were more skeptical of such a 
presumption of harm. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
argued that not all cartels cause harm, and that there is a huge difference 
between hardcore price cartels and more loosely based cooperations. 
Making them all presumed to cause harm would be too far-reaching. 
Furthermore, the Committee criticized the lack of instruction how the 
presumption could be rebutted.
268
Member of Parliament Eppink thought
that creating a presumption of harm was against general EU principles, that 
it is the claimants that have the burden of proof. Eppink also stated that it 
would be too burdensome for a defendant to rebut the presumption.
269
The 
other Committees supported the directive’s solution.
270
  
The Council stated that it is up to national rules how to quantify damages. 
Therefore, it is important to let the national courts estimate the damages 
rather than having the courts calculate precisely. This will also make it 
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easier to prove the damage for the victims.
271
The Council also supported
the existence of a rebuttable presumption of harm in cartel cases.
272
Finally, the article provides that competition authorities may assist national 
courts if they request help to determine the quantification of damages.    
4.2.8 Consensual Dispute Resolution, art 18-19
In the directive, the Commission wanted competition infringers and victims 
to have the possibility of participating in a consensual dispute resolution. 
During the time dispute resolution takes place, the limitation periods for 
claims will be stopped and court proceedings be ceased concerning the 
participants of the consensual dispute resolution. In the case of a settlement, 
the claim of the settling injured party is reduced by the settling co-
infringer’s share of the total harm caused by the infringement. The settling 
co-infringers shall then only be secondarily responsible for the rest of the 
harm, in case the other co-infringers cannot pay.
273
According to the art 18, 
a competition authority may take compensation paid through consensual 
settlement into account when setting fines.
This proposal of promoting consensual dispute settlement was introduced in 
the white paper as a way of avoiding costly court actions and with the idea 
that it would shorten the procedures.
274
The European Parliament’s Committees were the ones who promoted the 
notion that a competition authority should take compensation paid under 
consensual dispute resolution into account and let this be a mediating factor
when setting fines.
275
On this issue, they have been partly successful. 
Also, according to the final text in art 19 of the directive settlements is to 
reduce the total claim with the share born by the settling infringer. The 
remaining co-infringers are only liable for the reminding claim and may not 
seek any compensation afterwards from the settling infringer on the basis of 
joint liability. However, when the co-infringers cannot pay their share of the 
damages the settling injured party can exercise the remaining claim against 
the settling infringer, if this has not been excluded by the agreement.  
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Finally, in the preparatory phase the Council had no special opinions or 
suggestions towards this part of the proposal and supported the idea of other 
means to dissolve the dispute, and thought it should be encouraged.
276
4.2.9 Further opinions and suggestions by the 
European Parliament
In addition to the suggestions in the Commission’s directive proposal, the 
Committees as well as individual Members of Parliament had further 
suggestions of what should be incorporated in the directive. However, none 
of these had any impact on the final text of the directive. 
4.2.9.1 Collective actions
The question concerning collective actions has been a long debated one.
Even after the Commission’s recommendation from June 2013, there are 
still voices wanting a more active approach concerning collective redress in 
private enforcement matters.
There is nothing in the directive about collective redress, and the Council 
has stated that the directive should not include a provision forcing Member 
States to create such a system either.
277
The European Parliament’s Committees were of a different opinion and felt 
the need for an EU collective action. However, the right of collective action 
should not be unlimited but limited to qualified entities on an opt-in base.
278
4.2.9.2 Protection for Whistleblowers
The protection of individuals who report competition infringement, “whistle 
blowers”, is also concerning parts of the European Parliament. The 
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection would have 
liked the protection of whistle blowers to be under EU law, instead of as 
today under national law lacking coherency between the Member States.
279
The identity of the whistle blower should also be protected.
280
4.2.9.3 Prohibition of punitive damages and working 
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on a continency fee
A few suggestions by individual Members of Parliament would also further 
have curbed the popularity of private enforcement, and secured the 
compensation driven approach. Since deterrence would be the aim of public 
enforcement, it was suggested that the directive should prohibit punitive 
damages.
281
In order to prevent abuse in private enforcement actions, it is 
also suggested to forbid legal counsels to work on a contingency fee, as it 
may result in costly and frivolous actions.
282
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5 Discussion and analysis
5.1 General findings
It is clear that public enforcement has been the dominant system in the EU 
for finding and ending competition infringements. Private enforcement
actions have been hampered by underdeveloped legislation and huge 
differences between the Member States that have made it hard for victims to 
claim compensation. This is a huge difference compared to the situation of 
private enforcement in the US, where victims claiming compensation from 
the infringers has been the dominant way of penalizing competition 
infringements.
However, the Courage case showed that victims could claim compensation 
for competition infringements and to some extent marked the starting point 
for private enforcement within the Union, even though there had been 
earlier cases. With the Ashurst report from 2004 as a foundation the 
Commission has worked with an array of measures to make private 
enforcement more efficient within the Union. Sometimes the Commission 
has even worked too fast for the other institutions to follow, as with the 
shelved directive on collective actions.
The aim of private enforcement as providing compensation, not deterrence 
has been the guiding principle from the start. The US system with huge 
number of litigations and vast costs incurred for both defendants and 
claimants has been such deterrence in the EU that the only effort to speak of 
punitive damages was buried with the green paper. It is hard to see why it 
was abandoned so fast as treble damages plays such an important role in the 
US, providing good incentives to push claims even though interest is not 
awarded and legal fees higher. The green paper option was perhaps too 
extreme, as the double damages awarded would have been based on the 
injury plus interest from the time of the infringement as stated in the 
Manfredi case. Such double damages would probably have surpassed even 
the US treble ones. This was probably one of the aspects why the punitive 
damage part was excluded so fast. However, in dismissing the US way of 
private enforcement the EU perhaps misses the necessary elements that 
made it so popular in the US, and thereby may fail to make it popular here.
It is clear that with the current legislative framework, by combining soft 
law, regulations and the new directive, the EU deals with the problems 
encountered by victims of competition infringement and makes 
compensation claims easier to achieve. The directive includes legislation 
vital for successful claims, and the Commission has carefully balanced the 
interests between claimant and defender, as well as protected the public 
enforcement mechanism.
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However, looking back on the green paper, the directive seems less 
ambitious and bold, with a more practical approach. This is no surprise 
since the green paper’s suggestions were more influenced by the US 
approach and had the aim of investigating different paths of private 
enforcement. Some inevitable had to be abandoned in favour of other 
solutions. The white paper expressed an aim to provide full compensation to 
victims in a balanced approach between infringer and victim and secure the 
strength of public enforcement. These goals have been mainly achieved by 
the new directive. The question is though, if the frequent balancing between 
the different interests between infringer and victim, between the private and 
public enforcement, has led to that the directive lack new radical ideas for 
really promoting private enforcement, rather than codifying a status quo of 
the present state of private enforcement in the Member States. Private 
enforcement is obviously an area important to a lot of major players such as 
Member States, the Commission, companies, public interest groups, as well 
as being the first time the Parliament had a say on competition legislation, 
and in such a situation it is not surprising that former radical ideas get 
grinded away in the negotiation process.   
5.2 The new directive
With the new directive, it is clear that the Commission has had two main 
goals. The first has been to secure the popularity of the leniency system by 
securing that the companies participating does not end up in a worse 
situation than their co-infringers. It is easy to imagine that if a leniency 
applicant were to finish the procedure and avoid the fines, just to find itself 
being the first available target for a private action claim, with its victims 
having access to the leniency file, this would really qualify as an “out of the 
frying pan, into the fire” situation. It is therefore not strange that the 
Commission has worked hard to find a way to avoid this situation, 
especially when looking at the huge importance of the public enforcement 
system as a way of detecting competition infringements. The fact that every 
case where the Commission fined cartels in 2013 originated from a leniency 
application shows the huge impact of that system. The second aim has been 
to harmonize the rules for private enforcement within the Union, in order to 
minimize the forum shopping and give all victims equal possibility to claim 
compensation. The Ashurst report from 2004 clearly showed that the area 
lacked coherent and relevant rules to help claimants. The fact that most 
private enforcement cases today are largely conducted in just a few Member 
States also highlights the need of a coherent system.
The new directive solves some of the problems identified in the Ashurst 
report, such as confirming private enforcement as a compensatory measure, 
being able to use competition authorities’ earlier decisions as binding 
evidence of an infringement, clearly support the passing on defence and give 
further guidelines how national courts should handle the calculation of 
damages. However, perhaps the Commission has merely codified principles 
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already applied by the ECJ, rather than taken bigger steps to promote private 
enforcement.
5.2.1 Scope and definitions
The scope and definition part of the directive, articles 1- 4 state the 
compensatory aim of the directive, which forms the greatest difference 
between the EU and the US system. The possibility of treble damages has 
been seen as one of the reason why private enforcement has been so 
successful in the US, and the question remains; if excluding multiplied 
damages in the EU will private enforcement actions provide enough 
initiative for claimants to conduct such proceedings. EU has chosen that 
public enforcement should be what provides deterrence from conducting 
competition infringements, but the fact remains that victims bears huge risks 
by initiating private enforcement proceedings, perhaps this should make it 
legitimate to increase the possible benefits.
The inclusion of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence does not 
change the legal situation. As general principles of EU law they are to be 
adhered regardless if they are included in the directive or not, but including 
them can be seen as a nice reference to the Courage and Manfredi case 
where it began.
5.2.2 Disclosure of evidence
The new system of disclosure of evidence is no doubt one of the greatest 
new features of the directive, and in many civil law countries, this will be 
something completely new. It will be interesting to follow the case law 
towards all the criteria for disclosure that will inevitable arise in order to 
make the proportionality assessment more tangible. By the wording of the 
articles, the EU institutions once more seem to have the US situation in 
mind, where the wide possibilities of discovery have been extensively used. 
The situation in the US where the Twombly case seems to have highlighted 
the costs of generous discovery rules shows that the area is still affected by 
new case law that swings the pendulum back and forth, as of how generous
it should be, and this will doubtless be the case in the EU as well. 
As of the wording of the criteria a claimant has to fulfil in order to file a 
successful disclosure request as well as the wording of the proportionality 
check conducted by the national court including the prevention of fishing 
expeditions, shows that the EU has been aware of the potential dangers with 
allowing a too broad possibility of discovery. The wording of the criteria 
has also changed slightly since the Commission’s original proposal
compared to the final text, showing the slightly different views between the 
institutions.
The part on disclosure of evidence is one of the most important parts of the 
directive, as one of the problems encountered by claimants is that most of 
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the evidence needed is in the hands of the infringer. Constructing a system 
of disclosure thereby gives victims a chance of acquiring necessary evidence 
without too much effort. A claimant has to show “a reasoned justification 
containing reasonable available facts and evidence”. This should include for 
example news from competition authorities about decisions or 
investigations, or maybe economic comparisons between countries to show 
price differences. Future case law will probably show a wide variety of 
evidence used to support a filing for disclosure.
As of the protection of documents included in a NCA’s file, the 
Commission’s absolute ban on using leniency statements and settlement 
submissions is somewhat understandable. The Donau Chemie and the 
Pfleiderer judgments showed that there was a need to end the uncertain 
situation towards disclosure of sensitive documents. However, the 
protection of an infringer against its victims who may have suffered great 
losses because of the infringer’s conduct seems somewhat hard to justify. It 
is clear though, that the leniency program helps discover many cartels and 
thereby provides unaware victims possibility to claim compensation. The 
Commission has maybe struck a suitable balance between the interests of 
infringers and victims, by at least allowing document prepared especially for 
a public enforcement proceedings to be disclosed when such a proceeding is 
finished. This gives claimants in a private enforcement action possibility to 
access relevant information generated through public enforcement and 
provides a nice connectivity between the two enforcement branches.
The notion that competition authorities should only be responsible to 
disclose evidence that a party or third party could not reasonable supply 
themselves seems a bit strange. I cannot find some other justification for this 
amendment to the final text except to ease administrative burden. However, 
since according to the proportionality assessment the cost of disclosure 
should be taken into account, it would be more suitable to let the party with 
the least difficulties provide evidence. There should be many examples 
where competition authorities have their files more organized and readily 
available, especially if such evidence is needed in a private enforcement 
claim, it may not been kept in an orderly way by the infringer.
5.2.3 Effect of national decisions, limitation 
periods, joint and several liability
The new rule that national courts cannot take a decision running counter that 
of a final infringement decision taken by a national authority is a great 
improvement. Not only is it a logical next step to the earlier rule in 
Regulation 1/2003 about Commission decisions, but also a very easy way to 
lower litigation cost and shorten proceedings for parties. There is no real 
downside as infringers’ right to fair process is being adhered to in earlier 
proceedings where they would have been provided with ample opportunities 
to plead their innocence. The US law also contains a similar rule, which 
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should prevent multiple proceedings over same matter. This article also 
showed the different interests of the institutions as according to the 
Commission’s proposal, all decisions taken within the Union would have 
such binding effects. The Council was firmly against this and apparently 
came out the winner. However, as a competition infringement to a large 
extent affects a lot of different markets, perhaps the Council’s opinion that 
made into the final text is a bit narrow minded. Doubtless, a lot of private 
enforcement actions in different Member States will now have to argue if a 
conduct is or is not an infringement, possible giving rise to different 
conclusions. This is not helping victims or harmonizing the common 
market, as it will make it easier to conduct private enforcement in countries 
where the question of guilt has already been established.
The choice of limitation periods seems adequate, especially since a lot of 
different criteria have to be fulfilled in order for the period to start counting. 
Five years after an infringement has stopped and a victim could reasonable 
expect an illegal injury and who’s to blame seems a generous time limit, but 
one has also to consider the implications arising when a co-infringer have 
difficulties to provide compensation. The need for a claim for joint and 
several liability may be discovered years after the infringements have ended.
The two new exceptions to the principle of joint and several liability are 
interesting. The exception that immunity recipients are only liable to their 
own direct and indirect purchasers are reasonable. As the Commission 
stated in its proposal, a decision for a leniency recipient often becomes final 
before that of its co-infringers. As such, leniency recipients are earlier 
available for private enforcement claims. Therefore, it should be 
proportional to except them from join and several liability. Still, this comes 
with a safety valve for the victims, the notion that an immunity recipient can 
still be secondary liable to compensate. The protection of the immunity 
recipient does thereby not harm any victims’ right to compensation. In the 
same time it helps to create a situation where the immunity recipient, who 
often has provided vital information for the investigation of the cartel, does 
not end up in a worse situation than its co-infringers who did not help.
The other exception available for small or medium-sized companies is also 
interesting. This was added in the final text after negotiations between the 
institutions and seems to have similarities with the Commission’s earlier 
regime regarding “inability to pay”. This exception is construed in such a 
way it will be exceptionally hard to qualify. The notion of “irretrievably 
jeopardize its economic viability” is relatively straight forward, but “cause 
its assets to lose all its value” seems hard to qualify for. Surely, very few 
assets will lose all its value just because a company falls into hard times. It 
is also peculiar in regards to the market share that there is no time limit set 
up during which the market share shall be below 5 %. With the current 
wording, “any time” could potentially be fulfilled if a company stopped 
selling its products for a week, or even for a day.
The suggestion that the main rule of joint and several liability is excluded 
for a leniency applicant, who will only be secondarily responsible for other 
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injury than to its own direct and indirect suppliers and purchasers seems 
reasonable. It is very close to how the system looks like in the US.
5.2.4 Passing-on of overcharges
The policy choice by the Commission allowing the passing on defence is no 
surprise. By allowing defendants to use the passing on defence, the risk that 
direct purchasers will be unjustly enriched diminishes. This view is 
completely in line with the aim of private enforcement as compensation. 
Unfortunately, this policy choice threatens to lead the whole point with 
private enforcement astray, as the ones taking the direct hit of a competition 
infringement and are closest to see the effects, often will be barred from 
making a claim. As already argued by the US Supreme Court, the harm of a 
competition infringement will be more and more diluted the further down 
the line of purchasers it travels. Consumers or indirect purchasers will have 
suffered such a small injury that they will have no incentive to commence a 
costly and lengthy compensation claim. The policy choice may work in a 
perfect world, but as it looks now it threatens to leave many infringers 
unjustly enriched by their infringement. It would have been much better if
this policy choice had been accompanied by attractive rules on collective 
claims, increasing the incentives for consumers and indirect purchasers to 
bundle their claims, but this has not happened. I´m also a little bit hesitant to 
what extent a purchaser can raise their prices to pass overcharges on, 
without losing many customers in today’s globalized world. As information 
technology has made global trade easier and brought fierce competition 
even between companies on different continents, maybe the possibilities of 
passing on overcharges are limited to that extent that a possible over  
compensation among purchasers are negligible. Also, increasing price 
because of an overcharge in the supply chain will always reduce amount 
sold. This results in that even though a passing on has occurred, a direct 
purchaser has still suffered an injury that should be compensated. Therefore, 
everyone involved will still be able to produce claims for compensation, 
making litigation plentiful. 
The burden of proof in the directive concerning the passing on defence is 
appropriately placed, and the abolishment of the Commission’s complicated 
exception that the passing on defence could not be raised if it would be 
legally impossible for indirect purchasers to claim damages is appropriate. 
As been pointed out, such a national rule barring claims would be against 
EU law and should thus be removed. Furthermore, national courts would 
probably not have applied this exception in a uniform way, harming the 
coherence of the legislation between Member States.
The new guidelines that shall be published by the Commission towards the 
passing on defence should be most welcomed by national courts, and the 
rather detailed rules in the directive concerning passing on should benefit 
from practical guidelines. 
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5.2.5 Quantification of harm   
Giving national courts the power to estimate damages, rather than calculate 
it precisely, should make it easier for victims to succeed with parts of their
claims. This since victims do not have to prove their harm precisely, 
something that could be impossible to succeed with.
The presumption that cartels cause harm survived from the Commission’s 
proposal, and is present in the final text, despite some Members of 
Parliament’s objection. The presumption however is rebuttable, and does 
not put inappropriate pressure on the infringer. The survey that 9 out of 10 
cartels causes harm should make the presumption justifiable, and that “the 1 
out of 10” cartel has the possibility to supply evidence why it has been so 
insignificant to cause no harm.
Giving national courts the possibility to request competition authorities’ 
help to assess damages at first glance seems like a good solution, especially 
since competition authorities in many cases should have been involved in 
earlier proceedings and may have acquired valuable knowledge. However, 
the role of a competition authority as amicus curiae to the national court, in 
a case where it has already delivered a decision gives rise to an important 
issue, as to what extent a competition authority may be challenged for 
impartiality. A competition authority that first fines an infringer and then 
advice the court how to assess damage claims against that same infringer 
seems questionable at best.
5.2.6 Consensual dispute resolution   
The possibility of consensual dispute resolution is seen as an important tool 
to lower the cost and time of private enforcement actions. This is of course 
an important part, but it should always be noted that negotiations outside
courts are often power based, and there is a real threat that a smaller party 
will not be sufficiently compensated in those negotiations. A better 
suggestion would have been to involve the Commission or a NCA to 
oversee the settlement procedure, providing experience and insight as 
mediators.  
The European Parliament’s suggestion to allow authorities to take note of 
agreed compensation deals and give a discount in the fining if consensual 
settlements are reasonable is interesting, as it made it into the final text. This 
comes close to the US system where cooperation with victims is necessary 
to receive leniency. The EU would have been better of copying that 
arrangement as it would give victims a strong position with a competition 
authority on their side, but in the same time it would perhaps be blending 
the two enforcement branches together too much, disrupting their different 
aims.
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The rules to protect a settling infringer from secondary claims both from co-
infringers as well as from injured parties if this has been stated in the 
settlement agreement is a reasonable way to provide incentives for 
settlements. It will be easy to estimate the final costs for an infringer and 
will help to bring a fresh start anew. The policy choice here seems the best 
one available, as also showed by the institution’s common views. 
5.3 Other comments
An issue that the directive is silent on, and has been so since the white 
paper, is the question about the distribution of costs of the private 
enforcement process both on the victim’s and the infringer’s behalf. In the 
US, the main rule is that a successful claimant gets his legal expenses 
compensated as well, while this rule does not apply to a successful 
defendant.  The green paper only suggested an option of introducing special 
rules to limit the risks of the claimant, and had no impact on the directive, 
possibly implying that the Member States already have proper legislation in 
this area. However, leaving out such an important issue to be dealt with by 
the Member States themselves leads to the risk of forum shopping and 
fractioning between the Member States, exactly what the aim of the 
directive was to minimize. Furthermore, the lack of rules laid down on how 
a successful defendant could obtain compensation for his defence, this gives 
the impression that the Commission has not thought of this asymmetry as a 
problem. By laying down the distribution of legal costs between the 
claimant and the defender on an EU level, the EU could have addressed both 
the fear of frivolous lawsuits and the fractionalisation of the area, aims that 
now have to be addressed through other measures. 
5.3.1 The collective redress situation
The US system with generous class action rules including allowing opt-out 
claims, lawyers working on contingency fees and treble damages has been a 
huge deterrence for the EU. The Commission was seriously burnt when 
having to shelve the proposed directive on collective redress, showing how 
afraid Member States are of the US kind of system. Still, collective redress 
has a vital role to play when it comes to private enforcement, especially as 
the defendants may raise the passing on defence. It is important that 
fractioned injury dealt to indirect purchasers and consumers may be bundled 
to secure a cost-efficient and viable alternative to letting the injury pass 
uncompensated.
There is also another problematic aspect where collective redress could have 
been a suitable solution. It is possible that many victims that have suffered 
from a competition infringement have a very weak position against their 
suppliers and do not want to be seen as the “problematic customer” that 
claims compensation. It is easy to imagine quite a few scenarios where 
victims would be hesitant to bring claims, as it would hurt important 
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business relationships. Giving those victims the possibility to bundle their 
claims and join forces with other victims to bring compensation would be a 
great solution. 
The Commission’s recommendation is all too weak to accomplish this, and 
it should cooperate with the European Parliament to secure a stronger 
option. The European Parliament has shown to be more positive of such an
approach and together, the two institutions could put pressure on the 
Council. There is a middle way between the current EU situation and the 
extreme US one. Opt-in actions or only letting special associations conduct 
collective actions would constitute such a middle way. The question of 
collective actions on an EU level is however quite dead, as the directive 
does not mention it at all. It has been left to individual Member States to 
provide necessary mechanisms for this. Unfortunately, this will not help
victims in different Member States with small, diluted losses that would 
need a harmonized cross-border mechanism to obtain compensation.
5.4 The status of victims with the new 
directive
A victim who has suffered from a competition infringement has the 
possibility to use a combination of the two enforcement branches. 
Suspecting to have found a competition infringement, the victim could try to 
present available evidence to the competition authorities having them 
investigate the matter. However, this would not lead to any compensation 
being awarded directly, as the victim would still have to launch a private 
enforcement claim to obtain this. The public enforcement could still be of 
immense help in a private enforcement claim since the documents and 
findings that have been made there could be used in a compensation claim 
after the public enforcement has ended. Such a follow-on action should be 
easier to succeed with, and in most cases the public enforcement 
investigations will probably have been what made the victims aware that 
they had suffered loss due to a competition infringement at all. This shows 
the balance of the two enforcement systems, public and private, and the 
benefits that public enforcement can bring to a claim for compensation.
The new disclosure system in private enforcement disputes will be hugely 
beneficial for claimants, since the information asymmetry leads to most 
evidence being in the hands of the infringer. Being able to have a court 
order an infringer to turn over documents will lead to a better chance for 
claimants to prove both the infringement and their loss. This new system 
with the proportionality assessment will probably be new to a lot of Member 
States’ legal regimes since it lays out in detail the aspects that should be 
considered. However, the new disclosure system also bring new absolute 
restrictions, not present before. The prohibition on the use of leniency 
statements and documents and the notion that documents prepared for 
public enforcement can only be used when this procedure has ended 
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imposes limitations on victims and shows that not all new things in the 
directive is good for a claimant. The binding effect of national decisions is 
also new and will be of immense help for claimants to bring down the cost 
of litigation, and is probably the second most important new features of the 
directive after the disclosure system.
As for the passing on defence and allowing indirect purchaser legal 
standing, this does not constitute anything new in my opinion. Even though 
the green paper argued that the ECJ hadn’t taken a stance on the subject, in 
my opinion the Courage case notion that “any individual” could claim 
compensation leaves no other interpretation than that indirect purchasers 
had standing even before the directive, and as a legal consequence the 
passing on defence must be allowed, as it would otherwise allow for 
compensation of an injury not really suffered.
The limitation period offers no great change, but the presumption of harm in 
the case of a cartel definitely helps facilitate a compensation claim. The 
notion of joint and several liability guarantees that there will never be any 
victims left without compensation if there is even a single infringer able to 
supply it.
Even as the new directive offers none of the incentives present in the US 
system, and is completely silent on collective actions, it nevertheless 
contains new features that will be hugely beneficial to claimants bringing a 
compensation claim. The institutions of the EU have wanted to bring 
balanced rules and protect the public enforcement as well as promote the 
private side. This has led to some restrictions that have a negative impact on 
the private enforcement, but this will probably be a price worth paying since 
the public enforcement branch brings many advantages to be used in 
compensation claims. With the new directive, private enforcement will 
never be the industry it is in the US, which perhaps really would only 
benefit the legal representatives, but the new directive gives claimants 
possibilities to overcome many of the problematic areas present when 
launching a claim. The only real regrettable thing is the lack of a uniform 
collective action regime, as it would have helped victims with diluted claims 
to form EU wide actions. Instead, those diluted claims will probably never 
be compensated, thereby leading to unjust gain for an infringer.
Furthermore, a harmonized collective actions regime could have helped 
weaker parties, who are afraid that bringing a compensation claim towards 
important suppliers could hurt business relationships, giving victims the 
possibility to become more anonymous in a larger collective action. Despite 
this, the overall view of the directive is hugely positive for victims. 
The legal regime in the EU has been given a more coherent view after the 
new directive, which fits nicely into the legal framework of previous 
legislation and soft law. As the directive brings more possibilities for 
claimants and bring legal certainty to areas where there previously were
none, in my view the new directive really gives the possibility for victims to 
become victors in private enforcement claims.
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